Trust-Checkliste für Drittanbieter-MCP-Server

# Console route, called with your session/access token (UserAuth). Developer+.
curl -X POST \
  https://api.orcarouter.ai/api/workspace/firewall/mcp_servers/42/probe \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <your-access-token>"

// Policy on the mcp surface: deny by default, allow only what you reviewed.
// tool_name_glob supports a full-segment wildcard: "github.*" (prefix),
// "*.exec" (suffix), or "*.shell.*" (infix). Mid-segment globs like
// "github.get_*" fall back to an exact match and won't expand.
{
  "default_verdict": "deny",
  "rules": [
    { "tool_name_glob": "github.create_issue", "verdict": "allow" },
    { "tool_name_glob": "github.get_issue",    "verdict": "allow" }
  ]
}

# Console route, UserAuth, Developer+.
curl https://api.orcarouter.ai/api/workspace/firewall/mcp_servers \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer <your-access-token>" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "github",
    "endpoint": "https://api.githubcopilot.com/mcp",
    "auth_mode": "bearer",
    "auth_json": "{\"token\":\"ghp_x\"}"
  }'

// An egress-stage rule scopes its verdict to the outbound destination.
// egress_json carries host/CIDR allow + deny lists.
{
  "stage": "egress",
  "verdict": "deny",
  "egress_json": "{\"deny\":[\"10.0.0.0/8\"]}"
}