1. gdpr erasure llm: the self-serve DSAR flow
Three console actions cover a data-subject access request end to end. Each is aUserAuth route under /api/user/* — driven by your console session,
never a relay (sk-orca-…) key:
Export
Download a portable JSON copy of your personal data before you delete.
Delete
Soft-delete immediately; schedule the irreversible scrub for +30 days.
Cancel
Restore the account any time inside the grace window.
2. Export your data (one concrete flow)
From the console, open Account → Privacy and choose Export my data. The console drives this read route with your session:Export stays available during the grace window. A scheduled-for-deletion
account is soft-deleted but can still reach export and cancel — portability
is the entire point of keeping that door open until the scrub runs.
3. Schedule the deletion
Account → Privacy → Delete my account soft-deletes the account immediately and schedules the PII scrub for now + 30 days:Password re-authentication
Password re-authentication
Password accounts must supply their current password on the delete
request — defense against a hijacked session permanently destroying
data. OAuth-only accounts have no password; the authenticated session
is the proof.
Sole workspace owner is blocked
Sole workspace owner is blocked
If you are the only owner of a shared team workspace that still has
other members, the delete is refused — otherwise teammates would
inherit an ownerless workspace. Transfer ownership or archive the
workspace first.
The root account cannot self-delete
The root account cannot self-delete
The instance root account is refused — self-erasing it would leave the
deployment with no super-admin. Hand off the root role first.
Repeat requests are idempotent
Repeat requests are idempotent
Calling delete again while already pending returns a friendly
“already scheduled” response rather than an error.
4. The 30-day grace window
The grace window is a deliberate undo buffer. Until it elapses the account is soft-deleted, not erased, and one call restores it:5. The PII scrub and its cascade purge
When the grace window elapses, a sweep runs the scrub. It does not just hide a row — it strips direct identifiers and cascade-purges the records your activity left across every observability surface:| Surface | What the scrub does |
|---|---|
| Account | Direct identifiers anonymized; credentials, keys, OAuth bindings, passkeys, and 2FA hard-deleted |
| Request logs | Purged from the request-log store |
| Accounting / usage rows | Username redacted and IP cleared on rows retained for billing |
| Guardrail matches | Purged — including any raw matched substrings |
| Firewall events | Purged — tool names, IPs, and request IDs attributed to you |
deleted-… placeholder, status disabled), so accounting and audit rows
that have a lawful basis to persist keep their shape while losing the
embedded personal data. Everything credential-bearing is hard-deleted —
true erasure, not a soft-delete that merely hides.
6. Erasure vs retention
Erasure and retention are two different clocks — don’t conflate them:- Retention ages out request logs on a rolling window for everyone — a 30-day default, server-clamped to a 180-day hard maximum. See Retention.
- Erasure is a one-time, account-scoped event triggered by a DSAR: the 30-day grace window, then the scrub.
7. Where this fits
Right-to-erasure is one piece of your data-subject obligations. Pair it with region-stamped evidence and the broader compliance loop:Retention
The rolling request-log window — 30-day default, 180-day clamp — that
runs independently of erasure.
Data residency
The region your signed compliance reports are stored and served under.
GDPR pack
Install the controls and ship signed GDPR evidence to an auditor.
Shared responsibility
What the gateway erases for you and what stays your decision.
